A tournament is examined in which two agents with different abilities choose efforts as well as risks. According to the previous literature, the more (less) able agent should choose a low (high) risk strategy, because the first one does not want to imperil his favorable position, whereas the last one can only gain by increasing risk. We show that this is not necessarily true. Risk taking affects equilibrium efforts as well as winning probabilities. Depending on both effects diverse equilibria are possible. For example, the low and the high ability agent may both choose high risks or both choose low risks.
INTRODUCTION
In tournaments, agents compete against each other for given prizes that have been fixed in advance. The most successful agents (i.e. the ones with the highest outputs or best performances) receive the winner prizes, whereas the less successful agents only get the lower loser prizes. Tournaments can be often observed in practice: salesmen compete for bonus payments which are only given to the ones with the highest sales (Mantrala et al., 2000) . Employees compete in job promotion tournaments to reach a better-paid job on a higher rank in the firm's hierarchy (e.g. Baker et al., 1994a Baker et al., , 1994b . There are a lot of sports contests, for example golf tournaments Bognanno, 1990a, 1990b; Orszag, 1994) or car racing (Becker and Huselid, 1992) . Often managers of the same industry compete against each other in a kind of tournament due to relative performance compensation (Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Eriksson, 1999) . Tournaments can be even observed in connection with broiler production (Knoeber, 1989; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994) .
Most of the tournament literature focuses on the agents' effort choices, especially on the work incentives that are induced by the spread between winner and loser prizes (see e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983) . But usually, agents do not only decide about effort in practice. They can also choose between more or less risky actions: managers can choose between innovative or conservative market strategies, or between more or less risky production technologies. Car racers have to decide about more or less careful driving and so on.
The agents' risk choices usually depend on the type of tournament. In a symmetric tournament where each agent has the same ability and chooses the same equilibrium effort, this effort is monotonically decreasing in risk (i.e. in the variance of the composed noise of the agents' production functions). Since in the symmetric equilibrium all agents have identical winning probabilities, each agent prefers a maximally risky action to minimize equilibrium efforts and, therefore, the disutility of work (Hvide, 2002) . In an asymmetric tournament, however, where agents have different abilities (or one agent has a lead), the agents' risk behavior will also differ. Intuitively, agents with high abilities will prefer less risky actions to preserve their favorable positions, whereas agents with low abilities, who have nothing to lose, will prefer more risky actions (e.g., Rosen, 1988 , p. 84, referring to Bronars, 1986 Knoeber and Thurman, 1994, p. 158) . These agents are the presumable losers of the tournament who will almost surely receive the low loser prizes. Therefore, choosing a very risky action can only improve their positions.
In our paper, we show that this intuition does not necessarily hold. A twoperson tournament model is analyzed with the agents differing in their abilities. At the first stage, the agents choose the risk of their technologies. At the second stage, efforts are chosen. It is shown that second-stage equilibria are symmetric and risk taking has two effects: it influences the work incentives (effort effect), but also the likelihood of winning (likelihood effect). In particular, equilibrium efforts will be increasing in risk, if the agents' abilities are sufficiently different. Our results show that depending on the interplay of effort and likelihood effect diverse equilibria are possible. For example, the low and the high ability agent may both choose high risks or both choose low risks. Equilibria will also depend on the spread between winner and loser prizes, on the shape of the cost function, and the magnitude of the ability difference.
There are also parallels to the paper of O' Keefe et al. (1984) , in which risk choice is endogenous, too. But contrary to our paper, (1) the organizer of the tournament and not the agents chooses risk (i.e. the monitoring precision), and (2) tournament prizes are endogenous. 1 O'Keefe et al. consider two types 1. Prizes may be exogenously given in job promotion tournaments in which wages are determined by collective wage bargaining with industry-wide unions (e.g. like in Germany), in sports contests when prizes are chosen by national or international sports organizations and not by individual organizers, in rent-seeking contests, or in oligopolistic contests when firms compete for market shares.
of agents -more and less able agents -and two types of tournaments -one tournament for the more able agents and the other one for the less able agents. The organizer of the tournament who cannot observe an agent's type optimally chooses the prize spread and the monitoring precision to achieve self-sorting among the agents and appropriate incentives in each tournament. The results show that both objectives can be met by choosing a low (high) prize spread and a high (low) monitoring precision in the low ability (high ability) tournament. The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the outcomes of the two stages of the game and highlight the impact of the effort and the likelihood effect. Section 5 uses a specific form for the cost function to characterize all subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL
We consider a two-stage tournament between the two risk-neutral agents A and B. Agent i's (i 5 A, B) production function can be described by
where a i denotes the ability of agent i, e i his effort level and e i an individual noise term. 2 e A and e B are assumed to be stochastically independent with e i $ Nð0; s 2 r i Þ. Let Da i ¼ a i À a j and Da ¼ Da i j j ¼ Da j . The agents' cost functions are c(e i ) with c 0 ðe i Þ > 0 and c 00 ðe i Þ > 0. At the first stage (risk stage), both agents observe the given abilities and simultaneously choose the risk of their respective production technologies, r i , with r i 2 L; H f g and s 2 H > s 2 L At the second stage (effort stage), each agent observes the chosen risks and decides about his effort e i . The two agents compete for given tournament prizes w 1 and w 2 with w 1 > w 2 ! 0. The prize spread w 1 À w 2 is denoted by Dw.
If y i 4y j , agent i will receive the winner prize w 1 whereas agent j gets w 2 (i; j ¼ A; B; i 6 ¼ j).
THE EFFORT STAGE
We look for subgame-perfect equilibria of the two-stage game. First we examine the tournament competition at the second stage. Agent i's objective 2. Alternatively, we could model heterogeneous agents by using different cost functions. But the additive model has the advantage that we can interpret the ability difference also as an agent's lead in a homogeneous tournament.
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Let G Á ; r i ; r j À Á denote the c.d.f. of the composed random variable e j À e i . Note that this random variable is again normally distributed with e j À e i $ N À 0; s 2 r A þ s 2 r B
Á . Hence, we have that i's probability of winning the tournament is given by
The existence of pure-strategy equilibria in tournament models is typically not automatically assured. 3 However, we can give a sufficient condition guaranteeing existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in our model and obtain the following result characterizing this equilibrium:
Proposition 1. A symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium at the effort stage will exist, if the following condition holds:
For given risk choices r i both agents exert the following effort level: 4 e * r i ; r j ; Da
The effort is strictly increasing in the prize spread Dw and strictly decreasing in the ability difference Da. The effort is single peaked in the total variance s 2 r i þ s 2 r j and highest at s 2 r i þ s 2 r j ¼ Da 2 :
Proof. A sufficient condition for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to exist at the effort stage is that the agents' payoff functions (1) are strictly concave in their own effort choice given any effort choice of their opponent and both agents risk choices r i and r j . Let gðÁ ;
For a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance
3. See the discussion in Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 845, fn. 2), or Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) . 4. Here fðÁÞ denotes the density of a standard normal distribution.
which attains a maximum value of 1=
< min e i c 00 ðe i Þ holds for s 2 r i þ s 2 r j ¼ 2s 2 L , existence will be guaranteed. Since GðÁ ; r i ; r j Þ is symmetric, we have 1 À Gðe i À e j þ Da i ; r i ; r j Þ ¼ GðÀe i þ e j À Da i ; r i ; r j Þ for agent j's winning probability. Given that condition (2) is met, the first-order conditions characterize the equilibrium. Agent i's first-order condition yields
Since gðe i À e j þ Da i ; r i ; r j Þ ¼ gðÀe i þ e j À Da i ; r i ; r j Þ the left-hand sides of both agents' first-order conditions are identical, which implies a symmetric equilibrium with e * i r i ; r j ; Da
Because of the convexity of the cost function c(e i ), the inverse of the marginal cost function, c 0À1 ðÁÞ, is monotonically increasing. The last part is then proved by checking that @e * =@ À s 2
Condition (2) ensures concavity of the agents' objective functions by requiring that the cost function is sufficiently convex. Note that this condition is independent of the value of the ability difference Da. For the rest of the paper, we assume that condition (2) is always met. Proposition 1 shows that both agents choose identical efforts in equilibrium. This result is independent of the normal distribution assumption: as e A and e B are independently and identically distributed, the convolution gðÁ ; r i ; r j Þ is always symmetric around zero. However, this result depends on modeling asymmetry by a production function that is additively separable in effort and ability. Asymmetry can be modeled in an alternative way by assuming different marginal cost functions for the agents. This alternative is chosen by Lazear and Rosen (1981, pp. 857-863) . 5 They show that, if only each agent himself knows his type, equilibrium efforts will differ 5. The same alternative is considered by McLaughlin (1988) , Glazer and Hassin (1988), Bull et al. (1987) . O' Keefe et al. (1984, pp. 46-51) discuss asymmetric tournaments in which individual output is described by the product of effort and ability. As in our paper, Höffler and Sliwka (2003) consider asymmetric tournaments in which individual output is given by the sum of effort and ability. Technically, the same situation arises in so-called unfair tournaments; see Weigelt et al. (1989) .
r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 in general. Equilibrium efforts will also differ, if both agents have different marginal costs and if this information is common knowledge (e.g. McLaughlin, 1988, p. 246) . Nevertheless, the numerical example in Hvide (2002) indicates that this alternative modeling of asymmetry would lead to similar effects concerning risk taking. According to Proposition 1, the equilibrium effort is decreasing in Da: the less the abilities of both agents differ, the closer the race and, therefore, the higher are the equilibrium effort levels. 6 On the other hand, incentives will be high, if the prize spread Dw becomes large. Incentives are also enhanced by a flat marginal cost function c 0 ðe i Þ. The flatter c 0 ðÁÞ, the steeper is its inverse c 0À1 ðÁÞ and the larger is e * r i ; r j ; Da À Á .
THE RISK STAGE
Now we can go back to stage 1 and analyze the optimal risk choice by each agent. The variance affects the agents' efforts as well as their winning probabilities. We start by taking a closer look at the first aspect.
Lemma 1. For a given technology choice r j of the other player there exists a threshold level for the ability difference, Dâ a, so that e * i ðH; r j ; DaÞ_e * i ðL; r j ; DaÞ for Da_Dâ a r j À Á : Furthermore, Dâ a H ð Þ > Dâ a L ð Þ:
which proves the first part of the lemma. To see that Dâ a H ð Þ > Dâ a L ð Þ, suppose
6. See also Höffler and Sliwka (2003 To understand this result on an intuitive level, suppose that the ability difference is very large and the risk of the technologies is low. In that case, the outcome of the tournament is largely determined by the abilities of both agents. On the one hand, the more able player knows that he will win the tournament with a high probability even with low effort. On the other hand, the less able player can affect his probability of winning only to a small extent. If the variance of the technologies increases, however, luck may compensate the ability difference which then will increase the impact of effort on the outcome of the tournament. This makes exerting effort more attractive for the low ability agent. That in turn forces the high ability agent to exert higher effort levels as well. For small values of Da the outcome of the tournament is less dependent on the abilities of the players but on effort. In such a situation, choosing a risky strategy decreases the influence of effort on the outcome. As in that way the marginal return of effort for both players is lowered, they both can commit to exert low efforts by selecting a high risk strategy. On a more technical level, as we have seen in Proposition 1, there is a unique positive value for the total variance (namely Da 2 ) at which the equilibrium effort is maximized. Hence, depending on the values of s 2 H and s 2 L relative to Da either high risk choices or low risk choices by both agents minimize effort. If Da > Dâ a H ð Þ then Da will be sufficiently large relative to s 2 H and s 2 L : Therefore, effort will be minimized with a low risk choice by both. On the other hand, if Da < Dâ a L ð Þ, then Da will be sufficiently small relative to s 2 H and s 2 L and effort will be minimized with a high risk choice by both. If Dâ a L ð Þ < Da < Dâ a H ð Þ, however, the effort is highest if one player chooses a high risk, the other one a low risk strategy. Total effort is minimized when either both choose a high risk or a low risk strategy. If only considering the effort effect, the risk choices by both players are strategic complements. A coordination problem exists although both agents' interests are perfectly aligned.
As we have pointed out above, risk taking influences as well each agent's probability of winning. This likelihood effect is characterized by Lemma 2:
Lemma 2. Player i's probability of winning will decrease (increase) in the total variance s 2 r i þ s 2 r j if he is the agent with the higher (lower) ability. If both agents have the same ability, the winning probability will not be affected by risk.
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with FðÁÞ as the c.d.f. of the standardized normal distribution. Letŝ s 2 ¼ s 2 r i þ s 2 r j and letŝ s 2 H >ŝ s 2 L be two possible values ofŝ s 2 . As FðÁÞ is monotonically increasing, we obtain
The winning probability of the agent with the higher ability decreases and that of the agent with the lower ability increases with total variance. Hence, more able agents will prefer the less risky and less able agents the more risky technology if they only consider the probability of winning the tournament.
Recall that when only considering the impact of the technology choice on the effort effect there is no conflict of interests between the two agents. If the ability difference Da is high they both will prefer a low risk, and when Da is low, they both want a high risk. However, when only the likelihood effect is considered there is a strong conflict of interests. The equilibrium outcome at stage 1 clearly depends on the relative importance of both effects. For a given strategy r j player i will prefer a high risk to a low risk if
Hence, when there is no difference in abilities the equilibrium is straightforward: 7
Proposition 2. If Da 5 0, both players will always choose the risky strategy, i.e. r i ; r j À Á ¼ ðH; HÞ.
If both players have different abilities, effort and likelihood effect may work in opposite directions and the total effect clearly depends on the parameter values and the shape of the cost function. Owing to the effort effect, the left-hand side of inequality (6) will be positive if and only if e * H; r j ; Da À Á < e * L; r j ; Da À Á . From Lemma 1 we know that this will be the case if and only if Da < Dâ a r j À Á . However, because of the likelihood effect, the righthand side of the inequality will always be positive for the more able player (Da i > 0) and negative for the less able one (Da i < 0). We can use these considerations to characterize some properties of possible equilibria at the risk stage: 7. This result has also been shown in Hvide (2002) .
Proposition 3. (i) If Da > Dâ a H ð Þ, the more able agent will always choose a low risk strategy L. (ii) If 0 < Da < Dâ a L ð Þ, the less able agent will always choose a high risk strategy H. (iii) There is no equilibrium in which the more able agent chooses the high risk strategy H and the less able the low risk strategy L. (iv) If c 0 ð0Þ ¼ 0 and Dw is sufficiently small, there will be a unique asymmetric equilibrium in which the more able agent chooses the low risk strategy L and the less able agent the high risk strategy H.
Proof. Results (i) and (ii) immediately follow from the discussion of inequality (6).
( which yields a contradiction.
(iv) If Dw 5 0 then e* 5 0 as c 0À1 0 ð Þ ¼ 0, and both sides of inequality (6) are zero. Furthermore, the derivative of the left-hand side of inequality (6) with respect to Dw at Dw 5 0 is c 0 e * L; r j ; Da À Á À Á @e * L; r j ; Da À Á @Dw À c 0 e * H; r j ; Da À Á À Á @e * H; r j ; Da À Á @Dw ¼ 0
Since the derivative of the right-hand side is always positive (negative) for the more (less) able agent, the likelihood effect dominates the effort effect for sufficiently small Dw which then leads to a unique asymmetric equilibrium.& Note that it is not always clear whether the more able agent chooses the low risk strategy and the less able agent the high risk strategy in equilibrium. Of course, this will be the case if both effects work in the same direction (results (i) and (ii)), or if the likelihood effect becomes dominant (result (iv)). However, according to Proposition 2 both agents may prefer the high risk strategy if the effort effect dominates the likelihood effect. As we have shown, there will never be an equilibrium in which the more able agent chooses the high risk and the less able agent the low risk strategy (result (iii)).
The specific equilibrium outcome depends on the precise shape of the cost function. For instance, Proposition 3 does not exclude equilibria where both choose a high or both a low risk, or the existence of multiple equilibria for the same parameter constellation. We will therefore give a complete equilibrium analysis by investigating a specific cost function.
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AN EXAMPLE
We assume that the cost function takes the simple form c e i ð Þ ¼ exp c Á e i ð Þwith c40. 8 This specific cost function exhibits fixed costs as c(0)40. This can be motivated by the fact that agents often have to bear costs before participating in a tournament. For example, athletes have to travel to a sports contest and sometimes have to pay an entry fee, or workers have to come to their respective employers to participate in a job promotion tournament. Often agents have to do some necessary training before starting in a tournament.
For given risk choices, the equilibrium effort is then determined according to (3):
By inserting the equilibrium effort levels into inequality (6) and simplifying we get that player i will choose a high risk, given his opponent's strategy r j , if
Note that this expression is independent of Dw. According to condition (2) the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies at the effort stage will be guaranteed if
Hence, for any value of c and s 2 L we can find a Dw such that existence is assured. Moreover, for small values of Dw the value of c can become arbitrarily small without violation of the existence condition.
As the right-hand side of inequality (7) is linearly increasing in c, all decisions are dominated by the likelihood effect for sufficiently large values of c and by the effort effect for small values of c. Recall that the left-hand side will be positive if and only if e * H; r j ; Da À Á < e * L; r j ; Da À Á or Da < Dâ a r j À Á . We can use these considerations to find all subgame-perfect equilibria of the game: 8. We have chosen this type of cost function as it turns out that with this specification examples for all equilibrium types can be found very easily such that the existence of an equilibrium at the effort stage is assured.
Proposition 4. Suppose c e i ð Þ ¼ exp c Á e i ð Þ with c40. (i) If Da > Dâ a H ð Þ, the more able agent will always choose a low risk strategy. The less able agent will choose a low (high) risk strategy, iff c is smaller (larger) than a certain cut-off value. (ii) If 0 < Da < Dâ a L ð Þ, the less able agent will always choose a high risk strategy. The more able agent will choose a high (low) risk strategy, iff c is smaller (larger) than a certain cut-off value. (iii) If Dâ a L ð Þ < Da < Dâ a H ð Þ, there will be three possible outcomes. For large values of c, there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium in which the more able agent chooses a low risk and the less able agent a high risk strategy. For intermediate values of c, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which either both agents choose a high risk or both a low risk strategy. For small values of c, two symmetric equilibria coexist in which either both agents choose a high risk or both a low risk strategy.
Proof. See the Appendix. &
The results of Proposition 4 emphasize a key point of the paper: the intuition formulated in the literature that the more (less) able agent will choose a low (high) risk strategy does not always hold. Depending on the impact of the effort effect relative to the likelihood effect, there also exist equilibria in which both agents choose the low risk or both the high risk strategy. If c is small, the costs of effort will be relatively small in comparison with the winner prize. Hence, both agents will exert a high effort to win the prize. In that case, the choice of technology is dominated by the concern to keep the equilibrium effort level as low as possible at the second stage and only the effort effect matters for the agents' decisions. As we have seen in Lemma 1, for small values of Da it will be beneficial for both agents to select high variances to limit the effort exerted, but for high values of Da the contrary is true. For intermediate values of Da, however, a coordination problem exists. If one agent chooses a more (less) risky strategy, the other one will prefer the same strategy since r i and r j are strategic complements in that respect.
If c is large, the costs of effort will be high relative to the winner prize. Hence, both will not exert too much effort to win the tournament in any case. Therefore, risk choice is dominated by the likelihood effect. But Lemma 2 gives us a clear-cut result in that case. The high ability agent will prefer a low risk to safeguard his position. The low ability agent chooses a high risk as this helps him to challenge the high ability agent.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis has pointed at two important effects of risk taking in tournaments: on the one hand, it affects the equilibrium effort levels (effort effect); on the other hand, the winning probabilities (likelihood effect). As we have shown, the impact of risk on effort levels crucially depends on the Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 difference in abilities of both participants. If agents' abilities are similar their efforts will decrease in risk, but if talents are sufficiently different the opposite will hold. The direction of the likelihood effect, however, does not depend on the magnitude of the ability difference. Concerning only the likelihood effect, the high ability agent always prefers a low risk strategy, whereas the low ability agent prefers a high risk. Different subgame-perfect equilibria are possible depending on the interplay of the effort and the likelihood effect.
APPENDIX. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
(i) The strategy for the more able agent follows from claim (i) of Proposition 3. To see the best reply of the low ability agent inspect inequality (7). He will choose a high risk strategy, if and only if this inequality holds for r j 5 L. The right-hand side (RHS) is negative for the low ability agent. The left-hand side (LHS) is negative as well because Da > Dâ a H ð Þ > Dâ a L ð Þ. Hence, the inequality will not hold, iff c is smaller than a certain value.
(ii) The proof proceeds analogously to (i). Explicit cutoff values for c for the two cases (i) and (ii) can be computed by rearranging inequality (7).
(iii) The best responses of the more able agent can be derived by inspecting (7) with Da i > 0: the RHS40. If r j 5 L, then LHSo0 and the more able agent will choose r i 5 L. If r j 5 H, then LHS40 and the more able agent will choose r i 5 L (r i 5 H), if The less able agent's best responses can be derived analogously from (7) with Da i o0, which implies RHSo0. If r j 5 L, then LHSo0 and the less able agent will choose r i 5 L (r i 5 H), if If r j 5 H, then LHS40 and the less able agent will choose r i 5 H.
Hence, three different outcomes are possible in case (iii): if c > maxfĉ c 1 ;ĉ c 2 g, we will have a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in which the more (less) able agent chooses a low (high) risk strategy. If c < minfĉ c 1 ;ĉ c 2 g, each agent will respond to low (high) risk by also choosing low (high) risk. In this situation, the two symmetric equilibria (L, L) and (H, H) coexist. If minfĉ c 1 ;ĉ c 2 g < c < maxfĉ c 1 ;ĉ c 2 g, two scenarios will be possible. Either, c c 1 < c <ĉ c 2 so that the more able agent chooses low risk as a dominant strategy and we have (L, L) as unique equilibrium, orĉ c 2 < c <ĉ c 1 so that the less able agent chooses high risk as a dominant strategy and we have (H, H ) as a unique equilibrium.
